על דעת אשתו ובניו הוא מפקיד

it is with the awareness that at times the bailee’s wife and his children will safeguard the item that he deposits it, as the bailee cannot be with the deposit at all times.

אמרי נהרדעי דיקא נמי דקתני או שמסרן לבנו ובתו הקטנים חייב הא לבנו ולבתו הגדולים פטור מכלל דלאחרים לא שנא גדולים ולא שנא קטנים חייב דאם כן ליתני קטנים סתמא שמע מינה

The Sages of Neharde’a say: The language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: Or if he conveyed the coins to his minor son or daughter for safeguarding, he is liable to pay. But if he conveyed them to his adult son and daughter, he is exempt. By inference, one can conclude that with regard to others, it is no different if they are adults and it is no different if they are minors. Either way, the bailee is liable to pay, as, if there were a difference, let the tanna teach: If he conveyed the coins to minors, without qualification. The Gemara concludes: Since the tanna specifically addressed the case of one’s minor children, learn from the wording of the mishna that the difference between minors and adults exists only with regard to one’s children.

אמר רבא הלכתא שומר שמסר לשומר חייב לא מבעיא שומר שכר שמסר לשומר חנם דגרועי גרעה לשמירתו אלא אפילו שומר חנם שמסר לשומר שכר חייב מאי טעמא דאמר ליה את מהימנת לי בשבועה האיך לא מהימן לי בשבועה

Rava says: The halakha is: A bailee who conveyed a deposit to another bailee is liable to pay. It is not necessary to say that this is the halakha if he was a paid bailee who conveyed the deposit to an unpaid bailee, as in that case the first bailee diminished the level of his safeguarding, as an unpaid bailee is exempt from paying in instances where a paid bailee is obligated to do so. But even if it was initially an unpaid bailee who conveyed the deposit for safeguarding to a paid bailee, the first bailee is liable to pay. What is the reason that he is liable in that case? He is liable, as the owner of the deposit can say to him: You are trustworthy to me when you take an oath that the item was stolen or lost. That person is not trustworthy to me when he takes an oath.

אתמר פשע בה ויצאת לאגם ומתה כדרכה אביי משמיה דרבה אמר חייב רבא משמיה דרבה אמר פטור

It was stated that there is an amoraic dispute: In the case of one who was negligent in safeguarding an animal, and it went into a marsh, where it was susceptible to thieves and predatory animals, but it died in its typical manner despite this negligence, i. e., it was neither stolen nor devoured, Abaye says in the name of Rabba: The bailee is liable to pay. Rava says in the name of Rabba: The bailee is exempt from doing so.

אביי משמיה דרבה אמר חייב כל דיינא דלא דאין כי האי דינא לאו דיינא הוא לא מבעיא למאן דאמר תחילתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס חייב דחייב אלא אפילו למאן דאמר פטור הכא חייב מאי טעמא דאמרינן הבלא דאגמא קטלה

The Gemara elaborates. Abaye said in the name of Rabba: He is liable to pay, and any judge who does not rule in accordance with this halakha is not a judge. It is not necessary to say that the bailee is liable in this case, according to the one who says: In a case where the incident was initially through negligence and ultimately by accident, one is liable to pay. According to this opinion, it is obvious that the bailee is liable to pay. But even according to the one who says: If the incident was initially through negligence and ultimately by accident one is exempt, here the bailee is still liable to pay. What is the reason that he is liable? It is because we say: The air of the marsh killed the animal. The negligence led to the death of the animal, and it was not due to circumstances beyond his control.

רבא משמיה דרבה אמר פטור כל דיינא דלא דאין כי האי דינא לאו דיינא הוא לא מיבעיא למאן דאמר תחילתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס פטור דפטור אלא אפילו למאן דאמר חייב הכא פטור מאי טעמא דאמרינן מלאך המות מה לי הכא ומה לי התם

Rava says in the name of Rabba: He is exempt, and any judge who does not rule in accordance with this halakha is not a judge. It is not necessary to say that the bailee is exempt in this case, according to the one who says: In a case where the incident was initially through negligence and ultimately by accident, one is exempt from payment. According to this opinion, it is obvious that the bailee is exempt. But even according to the one who says: In a case where the incident was initially through negligence and ultimately by accident, one is liable to pay, here the bailee is still exempt from payment. What is the reason that he is exempt? It is because we say with regard to the Angel of Death, who causes death by natural causes: What difference is there to me if the animal was here, and what difference is there to me if the animal was there? The cause of the animal’s death was natural, and there is no relevance given to the location of the death. Consequently, the bailee is exempt.

ומודי אביי דאי הדרא לבי מרה ומתה דפטור מאי טעמא דהא הדרא לה וליכא למימר הבלא דאגמא קטלה ומודי רבא כל היכא דאיגנבה גנב באגם ומתה כדרכה בי גנב דחייב מאי טעמא דאי שבקה מלאך המות בביתיה דגנבא הוה קיימא

The Gemara notes: And Abaye concedes that if the animal returned from the marsh to its owner’s house and died there that the bailee is exempt. What is the reason that he is exempt? He is exempt due to the fact that the animal returned, and since it was able to return there is no justification to say that the air of the marsh killed it. And Rava concedes that anytime the animal was stolen from the marsh and then dies in its typical manner in the house of the thief that the bailee is liable to pay. What is the reason that he is liable to pay? He is liable because even if the Angel of Death spared the life of the animal, it would be standing in the house of the thief due to the negligence of the bailee.

אמר ליה אביי לרבא לדידך דאמרת מלאך המות מה לי הכא ומה לי התם האי דאותביה רבי אבא בר ממל לרבי אמי ושני ליה בשנתנו לו בעלים רשות להשאיל ולימא ליה מלאך המות מה לי הכא ומה לי התם

Abaye said to Rava: According to you, who said with regard to the Angel of Death: What difference is there to me if the animal was here and what difference is there to me if the animal was there? How will you explain the exchange between Rabbi Abba bar Memel and Rabbi Ami? As there is that objection that was raised by Rabbi Abba bar Memel to Rabbi Ami from the mishna with regard to one who rents a cow from another, and then lends it to another person, and Rabbi Ami answered him: It is a case where the owner gave the renter permission to lend the deposit. Abaye states his challenge: But according to your explanation, let Rabbi Ami say to him that the bailee is exempt because with regard to the Angel of Death, what difference is there to me if the animal was here, and what difference is there to me if the animal was there. If the death would have happened regardless of the location of the animal, it makes no difference whether it was in the possession of the first renter or in the possession of the one he lent it to.

אמר ליה לדידכו דמתניתו אין רצוני שיהא פקדוני ביד אחר איכא לאותבה לההיא לדידי דאמינא אנת מהימנת לי בשבועה והאיך לא מהימן לי בשבועה ליכא לאותבה כלל

Rava said to Abaye: According to you, that you teach that a bailee who conveyed a deposit to another bailee is liable to pay because the owner can claim: It is not my desire that my deposit be in the possession of another bailee, there is room to raise that objection. But according to me, as I say that a bailee who conveyed a deposit to another bailee is liable to pay because the owner can claim: You are trustworthy to me when you take an oath that the item was stolen or lost; that person is not trustworthy to me when he takes an oath, there is no room to raise that objection at all.

מתיב רמי בר חמא העלה לראשי צוקין ונפלה אין זה אונס וחייב הא מתה כדרכה הרי זה אונס ופטור ואמאי לימא ליה אוירא דהר קטלה אי נמי אובצנא דהר קטלה

Rami bar Ḥama raises an objection to the opinion of Abaye from a mishna (93b): If one brought the animal to the edge of a cliff and it fell, that is not considered an accident, and he is liable to pay. One may infer that if he brought it to the edge of the cliff and it died in its typical manner, that is considered an accident and he is exempt. But why? Let the owner of the animal say to the bailee: It is the air of the mountain that killed it, or: The exhaustion from climbing the mountain killed it.

הכא במאי עסקינן שהעלה למרעה שמן וטוב אי הכי נפלה נמי שהיה לו לתוקפה ולא תקפה

The Gemara rejects this: With what are we dealing here? It is with a case where the bailee took the animal to a bountiful and high-quality pasture. Since shepherds typically herd their flocks there, taking the animal there is not negligent. The Gemara asks: If so, then the bailee should be exempt even if the animal fell. The Gemara answers: He is liable to pay because he should have subdued the animal to prevent it from falling, and he did not subdue it.

אי הכי אימא רישא עלתה לראשי צוקין ונפלה הרי זה אונס איבעי ליה למיתקפה לא צריכא שתקפתו ועלתה תקפתו וירדה

The Gemara asks: If so, say the first clause of the mishna: If the animal climbed to the top of a cliff and fell, it is a circumstance beyond his control and he is exempt. Shouldn’t he be liable, since he was required to subdue it and prevent it from falling? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for the tanna to say that the bailee is exempt only in a case where the animal overpowered him and ascended and the animal overpowered him and descended. Although he attempted to prevent the animal from falling, it overpowered the bailee and fell.

אמר רבי יוסי כיצד הלה עושה סחורה בפרתו כו׳ אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל הלכה כרבי יוסי אמר ליה רב שמואל בר יהודה לרב יהודה אמרת לן משמיה דשמואל חלוק היה רבי יוסי

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yosei said: How does the other party do business with and profit from another’s cow? Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda said to Rav Yehuda: You told us in the name of Shmuel that Rabbi Yosei was in disagreement with the first tanna