קטנה מן האירוסין אין עושים בה מאמר אלא מדעת אביה והנערה בין מדעת עצמה בין מדעת אביה (מה שאין כן בקידושין)

If a minor girl was widowed after her betrothal, a surviving brother of her betrothed can perform levirate betrothal only with the consent of her father. And in the case of a young woman, he can do so either with her consent [mida’at atzmah] or with the consent of her father, unlike the halakha with regard to standard betrothal. This indicates that a young woman can accept levirate betrothal on her own, despite the fact that it removes her from her father’s authority.

אלא אי איתמר הכי איתמר אמר רבי יוסי ברבי חנינא מאי טעמיה דרבי יוחנן אליבא דרבנן קידושין דמדעתה אביה ולא היא גירושין דבעל כרחה בין היא בין אביה

Rather, if it was stated, it was stated like this: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: What is the reason of Rabbi Yoḥanan, in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis? With regard to betrothal, which takes effect only with the consent of the one who accepts the betrothal, her father can accept it but not her, since betrothal requires his approval. With regard to a bill of divorce, which can be given without her consent, either she or her father can receive it.

הרי מאמר דמדעתה וקתני בין היא ובין אביה התם במאמר דבעל כרחה ורבי היא דתניא העושה מאמר ביבמתו שלא מדעתה רבי אומר קנה וחכמים אומרים לא קנה

The Gemara asks: But isn’t levirate betrothal valid only with her consent, like other betrothals, and yet it teaches in the baraita that either she or her father can accept it? The Gemara answers: There it is referring to levirate betrothal that is performed against her will, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. As it is taught in a baraita:

If a yavam performs levirate betrothal with his yevama without her consent, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The yavam acquires her. And the Rabbis say: He does not acquire her.

מאי טעמיה דרבי גמר מביאה דיבמה מה ביאה דיבמה בעל כרחה אף הכא נמי בעל כרחה ורבנן סברי ילפינן מקידושין מה קידושין דמדעתה אף הכא נמי דמדעתה

The Gemara clarifies: What is the reason of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? He derives the halakha of levirate betrothal from the halakha of sexual intercourse that a yavam engages in with a yevama: Just as intercourse with the yevama renders her acquired even if it is done against her will, so too here, in the case of levirate betrothal, the yavam can betroth her against her will. And the Rabbis hold that we derive the halakha of levirate betrothal from standard betrothal: Just as betrothal can be performed only with her consent, so too here, levirate betrothal can be performed only with her consent.

במאי קמיפלגי רבי סבר מילי דיבמה מיבמה הוה ליה למילף ורבנן סברי קידושין מקידושין הוה ליה למילף

The Gemara clarifies: With regard to what do they disagree? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that one should derive matters involving a yevama from other matters involving a yevama, and the marriage between a yevama and a yavam can be formalized against her will. And the Rabbis hold that one should derive matters involving betrothal from the halakhot of betrothal, as levirate betrothal is structured like standard betrothal in other respects.

הכי נמי מסתברא כדקא מתרץ רבי יוחנן מדקתני סיפא מה שאין כן בקידושין אלא נימא תיהוי תיובתא דריש לקיש אמר לך ריש לקיש הא מני רבי יהודה היא דאמר אין שתי ידים זוכות כאחת

The Gemara comments: So too, it is reasonable to rule with regard to betrothal as Rabbi Yoḥanan explains, that only the father can accept betrothal, from the fact that it teaches in the latter clause of the baraita that with regard to levirate betrothal, in the case of a young woman, the yavam can perform it either with her consent or with the consent of her father, unlike the halakha with regard to standard betrothal. This indicates that she can be betrothed in standard betrothal only with her father’s agreement. The Gemara asks: Then shall we say that this should be a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Reish Lakish, who holds that according to the Rabbis a young woman can also accept her own betrothal? The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish could have said to you: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: Two hands do not acquire an item as one.

אי רבי יהודה מה שאין כן בקידושין מה שאין כן בגירושין מיבעי ליה אין הכי נמי איידי דתנא מאמר דדמי לקידושין תנא נמי מה שאין כן בקידושין

The Gemara asks: If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, why does the baraita state: Unlike the halakha with regard to standard betrothal? It should have stated: Unlike the halakha with regard to divorce, as Rabbi Yehuda stated his opinion in the mishna with regard to divorce, not betrothal. The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so, it should have referred to divorce, but since it taught the halakha of levirate betrothal, which is similar to betrothal, it also taught: Unlike the halakha with regard to standard betrothal.

ורבי יהודה מאי שנא מאמר הואיל וזקוקה ועומדת השתא דאתית להכי רבי יוחנן נמי לא תיקשי לך מעיקרא שאני מאמר הואיל וזקוקה ועומדת

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, in what way is levirate betrothal different from divorce? Why can a young woman accept the former but not receive a bill of divorce, when both levirate betrothal and divorce can be performed without her consent? The Gemara answers: The halakha of levirate betrothal is different. Since she is bonded to the yavam and standing in wait for him, acceptance of the betrothal money by the yevama suffices to effect the levirate betrothal. The Gemara comments: Now that you have arrived at this explanation, the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan also should not pose a difficulty for you from the outset. One cannot question his statement with regard to the Rabbis’ opinion in the case of betrothal. Levirate betrothal is different, since the yevama is bonded to the yavam and standing in wait for him.

תנן האיש מקדש את בתו כשהיא נערה בו ובשלוחו בו ובשלוחו אין בה ובשלוחה לא תיובתא דריש לקיש אמר לך ריש לקיש הא נמי רבי יהודה היא

We learned in the mishna that a man can betroth his daughter to a man when she is a young woman, by himself or by means of his agent. The Gemara analyzes this: Yes, he can betroth her by himself or by means of his agent, but no, she cannot become betrothed by herself or by means of her agent. This is a conclusive refutation of Reish Lakish, who holds that according to the opinion of the Rabbis a young woman can accept her own betrothal. The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish could have said to you: This mishna too is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

ומי מצית מוקמת לה כרבי יהודה והקתני סיפא האומר לאשה התקדשי לי בתמרה זו התקדשי לי בזו ואמרינן מאן תנא התקדשי התקדשי

The Gemara asks: But can you establish this mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? But the last clause, in the following mishna (46b), teaches: In the case of one who says to a woman: Be betrothed to me with this date and adds: Be betrothed to me with that date, she is betrothed only if one of them is worth one peruta on its own. And we say: Who is the tanna who taught that the two dates are valued separately only if he said: Become betrothed and: Become betrothed, in a separate statement when giving each date, but that if he said: Become betrothed, only once, the value of the two dates are added together?

ואמר רבה רבי שמעון היא דאמר עד שיאמר שבועה לכל אחד ואחד

And Rabba said: It is Rabbi Shimon, who says that one is not liable to bring multiple offerings for taking false oaths to multiple people in the same utterance. For example, if one says: I take an oath that I do not have your item, nor yours, nor yours, he brings a single offering. This is the halakha unless one states an expression of an oath to each and every one of the plaintiffs, by stating: I take an oath I do not have yours; I take an oath I do not have yours, in which case he brings multiple offerings. Consequently, the tanna of this mishna is Rabbi Shimon, not Rabbi Yehuda.

וכי תימא כולה רבי יהודה ובפרטי סבר לה כרבי שמעון ומי סבר לה

And if you would say that the tanna of the entire mishna concerning betrothal is Rabbi Yehuda, and that with regard to the specification of separate oaths he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, this cannot be. But does he in fact hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon with regard to the specification of separate oaths?

והתניא זה הכלל כלל אינו חייב אלא אחת פרט חייב על כל אחת ואחת דברי רבי מאיר רבי יהודה אומר שבועה לא לך לא לך לא לך חייב על כל אחת ואחת רבי אליעזר אומר לא לך לא לך לא לך ולא לך שבועה חייב על כל אחת ואחת רבי שמעון אומר לעולם אינו חייב עד שיאמר שבועה לכל אחד ואחד

But isn’t it taught in a baraita:

This is the principle with regard to one’s liability to bring offerings for a false oath: If he included all the statements in one oath he is liable for only one oath, but if he specified them, he is liable for each and every one; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If one said: I take an oath that I do not have your deposit, nor yours, nor yours, nor yours, and he was found to have taken a false oath, he is liable to bring an offering for each and every one. Rabbi Eliezer says: If he said: I do not have yours, nor yours, nor yours, and nor yours, I take an oath, then he is liable for each and every one. Since he stated the oath at the end, it refers back to each element of his statement. Rabbi Shimon says: He is liable to bring more than one offering only if he states an expression of an oath for each and every one. This indicates that Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with Rabbi Shimon with regard to the question of when oaths are considered distinct.

אלא כולה רבי שמעון היא ובשליחות סבר לה כרבי יהודה

Rather, the Gemara explains in the opposite manner: The tanna of the entire mishna concerning betrothal is Rabbi Shimon, and with regard to the halakha of agency he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, that only the father of a young woman can appoint an agent to accept her betrothal or receive her bill of divorce.

רבי אסי לא על לבי מדרשא אשכחיה לרבי זירא אמר ליה מאי אמור האידנא בי מדרשא אמר ליה אף אנא לא עייל רבי אבין הוא דעייל ואמר חברותא כולה כרבי יוחנן וצווח ריש לקיש כי כרוכיא ויצאה והיתה וליכא דאשגח ביה אמר ליה רבי אבין בר סמכא הוא אמר ליה אין כמין ימא לטיגני הוא

The Gemara relates: One day Rabbi Asi did not go to the study hall. He found Rabbi Zeira and said to him: What was said to day in the study hall? Rabbi Zeira said to him: I too did not go, but Rabbi Avin is the one who went, and he said: The entire coterie sided with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan that there is a difference between betrothal and divorce in the case of a young woman. And Reish Lakish screamed at them like a crane: Doesn’t the verse state:“ And she departs out of his house and goes and becomes another man’s wife” (Deuteronomy 24:2), juxtaposing the halakhot of divorce and betrothal? But no one paid any attention to him. Rabbi Asi said to him: Is Rabbi Avin reliable? Can one be sure that he transmitted an accurate report? Rabbi Zeira said to him: Yes, in this case he can be trusted, since the elapsed time was only like the interval between catching a fish from the sea and bringing it to a frying pan [tignei].

אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק אנא לא רבי אבין ברבי חייא ולא רבי אבין בר כהנא אלא רבי אבין סתם למאי נפקא מינה למירמא דידיה אדידיה

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: When I quote this statement, I do not state it in the name of Rabbi Avin, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, nor Rabbi Avin bar Kahana, but in the name of Rabbi Avin, without specification. The Gemara asks: What difference is there? Why does it matter which Rabbi Avin is cited as the source of this statement? The Gemara answers: It would matter if one were to raise a contradiction between one of his rulings and another one of his rulings. If there were to be a conflicting opinion attributed to a specific Rabbi Avin, e. g., Rabbi Avin, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, it would not be a true contradiction, as this statement might have been issued by a different Rabbi Avin.

בעא מיניה רבא מרב נחמן

Rava asked Rav Naḥman: