ואסורים בדבר של אותה העיר ואיזהו דבר של עולי בבל כגון הר הבית והעזרות והבור שבאמצע הדרך ואיזהו דבר של אותה העיר כגון הרחבה והמרחץ ובית הכנסת והתיבה והספרים והכותב חלקו לנשיא

But it is prohibited for them to benefit from objects of that city, which are considered to be jointly owned by all its residents. And what are examples of objects belonging to those who ascended from Babylonia? For example, the Temple Mount, and the Temple Courtyards, and the water cistern in the middle of the road. And what are objects of that city? For example, the city square, and the bathhouse, and the synagogue, and the ark which houses the Torah scrolls, and the Torah scrolls. And one who writes, i. e., signs, his portion of the shared objects of that city over to the Nasi .

רבי יהודה אומר אחד כותב לנשיא ואחד כותב להדיוט מה בין כותב לנשיא לכותב להדיוט שהכותב לנשיא אין צריך לזכות להדיוט צריך לזכות וחכמים אומרים אחד זה ואחד זה צריכין לזכות לא דברו בנשיא אלא בהוה רבי יהודה אומר אין אנשי גליל צריכין לכתוב שכבר כתבו אבותיהן על ידיהן

Rabbi Yehuda says: This is the halakha with regard to both one who writes his portion over to the Nasi and one who writes it over to a common person. Rabbi Yehuda adds: What is the difference between one who writes it over to the Nasi and one who writes it over to a common person? That one who writes it to the Nasi need not formally confer possession of the item, whereas one who writes it over to a common person must confer possession to him. And the Rabbis say: Both this one and that one must confer possession, and they specifically mentioned the Nasi only so as to speak in the present, addressing situations that were prevalent. Rabbi Yehuda says: The people of Galilee do not have to write their portion over to the Nasi because their fathers already wrote it for them, declaring that all the public property belongs to him.

גמ׳ אמאי מיתסר אמר רב ששת הכי קתני ומה תקנתן יכתבו חלקן לנשיא

GEMARA: The mishna appears to teach that one who is prohibited by a vow from benefiting from another may not benefit from property written over to the Nasi . The Gemara asks: Why is it forbidden? Rav Sheshet said: This is what the mishna is teaching: And what is their remedy, i. e., what can be done to enable the forbidden individuals to benefit from communal property? They should write their portion over to the Nasi , thereby relinquishing their shares in the communal property.

רבי יהודה אומר אחד כותב לנשיא ואחד כותב להדיוט ומה בין כותב לנשיא לכותב להדיוט הכותב לנשיא אין צריך לזכות והכותב להדיוט צריך לזכות וחכמים אומרים אחד זה ואחד זה צריכים לזכות לא דברו בנשיא אלא בהוה

The Gemara continues its quotation from the mishna: This is the halakha with regard to both one who writes his portion over to the Nasi and one who writes it over to a common person. Rabbi Yehuda adds: What is the difference between one who writes it over to the Nasi and one who writes it over to a common person? That one who writes it to the Nasi need not formally confer possession of the item, whereas one who writes it over to a common person must confer possession to him. And the Rabbis say: Both this one and that one must confer possession, and they specifically mentioned the Nasi only so as to speak in the present.

רבי יהודה אומר אין אנשי גליל צריכין לזכות שכבר כתבו אבותיהן על ידיהן תניא רבי יהודה אומר אנשי גליל קנטרנין היו והיו נודרין הנאה זה מזה עמדו אבותיהם וכתבו חלקיהן לנשיא

§ The mishna teaches: Rabbi Yehuda says: The people of Galilee do not have to confer possession of their portion to the Nasi because their forefathers already wrote it for them. It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: The people of Galilee were quarrelsome [kanteranin] and would often take vows prohibiting benefit from one another. So their forefathers arose and wrote their portions of the public property over to the Nasi so that they would be able to use communal property.

מתני׳ המודר הנאה מחבירו ואין לו מה יאכל נותנו לאחר לשום מתנה והלה מותר בה מעשה באחד בבית חורון שהיה אביו נודר הימנו הנאה והיה משיא את בנו ואמר לחברו חצר וסעודה נתונים הינן לפניך אלא כדי שיבא אבא ויאכל עמנו בסעודה

MISHNA: With regard to one who is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another and he does not have anything to eat, the other may give the food to someone else as a gift and he is then permitted to eat it. The mishna recounts: An incident occurred involving someone in the city of Beit Ḥoron whose father had vowed not to derive benefit from him, and the son was marrying off his own son and wanted his father to be able to participate in the wedding meal. And he therefore said to another: The courtyard where the wedding will take place and the wedding meal are given before you as a gift, but only so that my father will come and eat with us at the meal.

אמר אם שלי הם הרי הם מוקדשין לשמים אמר לו נתתי לך את שלי שתקדישם לשמים אמר לו נתת לי את שלך אלא שתהא אתה ואביך אוכלין ושותין ומתרצין זה לזה ויהא עון תלוי בראשו אמרו חכמים כל מתנה שאינה שאם הקדישה תהא מקודשת אינה מתנה

The recipient said: If they are mine, they are all hereby consecrated to Heaven, i. e., the Temple, and are forbidden to everyone. The son said to him in anger: And did I give you my property so that you should consecrate it to Heaven? He, the recipient, said to him: You gave me your property only so that you and your father would eat and drink and thereby appease each other, and the sin of transgressing the vow would be hung on his, i. e., my, head, as I enabled the transgression. The Sages therefore said: Any gift that is not so absolute so that if the recipient were to consecrate the gift it would be consecrated, is not a gift. In other words, in order for it to be a gift, the recipient must have the ability to consecrate it.

גמ׳ מעשה לסתור חסורי מיחסרא והכי קתני ואם הוכיח סופו על תחילתו אסור ומעשה נמי בבית חורון באחד דהוה סופו מוכיח על תחילתו

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Was an incident cited to contradict that which was initially stated in the mishna? The mishna explicitly stated that one may give a gift to another in order to bypass the prohibition of a vow. The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete and is teaching like this: And if his ultimate actions prove the nature of his initial intent, i. e., if the prior owner protests that he gave the gift only as a technicality in order to bypass the vow, it is forbidden. And to illustrate this point, there was also an incident in Beit Ḥoron concerning someone whose ultimate protest proved that his initial intent was not to give a true gift.

אמר רבא לא שנו אלא דאמר ליה והינן לפניך אלא כדי שיבא אבא אבל אמר ליה שיהו לפניך שיבא אבא מדעתך הוא דאמר ליה

Rava said: They taught this prohibition only in a case where he said to him: And the gifts are given before you only so that my father should come, as he explicitly mentioned that he did not intend to give an absolute gift. But if he said to him less explicitly: That they should be before you that my father should come, there is no prohibition, since he is essentially say ing to him: It is up to your judgment whether or not to invite him.

לישנא אחרינא אמרין לה אמר רבא לא תימא טעמא דאמר ליה והינן לפניך הוא דאסור אבל אמר ליה הן לפניך שיבא אבא ויאכל מותר אלא אפילו אמר ליה הן לפניך יבא אבא ויאכל אסור מאי טעמא סעודתו מוכחת עליו

Some say another version of this statement. Rava said: Do not say that the reason for the prohibition is because he said to him: And the gifts are given before you only so that my father will come, and that is why it is forbidden; but if he said to him: They are before you so my father should come and eat, it would be permitted. This is not so. Rather, even if he said to him: They are before you, my father should come and eat, it is forbidden. What is the reason for this? His wedding meal proves about him that his sole intention was to bypass the vow.